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ADAPTING THE PROUST INDEX TO EXAMINE  
THE MACROECONOMIC VARIATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Alessandro Federico Conway
University of Pittsburgh, 2017
The viability of the European project is coming under serious question due to a combination of 
persistent economic stagnation coupled with the migration crisis, which together fuel the 
relentless rise of anti-establishment and anti-E.U. sentiments across the continent. Is the 
magnitude of these crises and their obdurate resistance to progress leading the European 
project towards failure? One of the potential future paths of the E.U., a formal ‘two-speed’ 
Europe, is in the works regarding the sectors of E.U. defense and border control. If such a 
framework were to be applied as a solution to their economic problems, E.U. countries could 
target policies based on their economic performance rather than a one-size-fits-all E.U. policy. 
Although a current, intrinsic, ‘two-speed’ framework exists in the E.U., it encounters several 
difficulties (namely political will and through a form of social pressure) that undermine its 
success, ultimately rendering it unconvincing. I develop an alternative approach based solely on 
economic performance by adapting the Proust Index, a macroeconomic index originally devised 
by The Economist which aggregates seven indicators. This analysis firstly reveals clearly 
divergent patterns of economic trends within the E.U. In the context of a ‘two-speed’ Europe, it 
then provides a set of hypothetical 'definitions' along which E.U. member-states could be 
divided, something largely missing or at best vague in the few instances it appears in official 
statements and in economic literature. Ultimately, because the significant gap in performance 
between the two groups is increasing, this thesis suggests that urgent action needs to be taken 
to address it whichever option the E.U. chooses for its future.
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1.0  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1.1  INTRODUCTION
Following a period of stability and steady economic growth, the European Union (E.U.) has 
experienced a multitude of crises starting with the financial collapse of 2007-2008 that was 
followed up by a full-on economic crisis two years later. While some of the E.U.’s twenty-eight 
member-states are emerging from the economic woes, others are still suffering. Domestic 
reforms imposed by the E.U. have been met with significant public outcry and not always 
produced results, in particular the austerity measures and spending reviews to pay back debt 
and increase competitiveness. The economic stagnation that characterizes many of the 
European economies today puts further into doubt the goals and success of the E.U. and raises 
the question of how much more strain its citizens can handle. 
The crises have also revealed several holes within the E.U. framework. For example, the 
Stability and Growth Pact of 1999, which sought to preserve stability within the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) by introducing moderate budgetary oversight and a dissuasive 
punishment mechanism, largely failed on its mandate as public debt levels soared in 2008 and 
remain high. Similarly, a Eurozone-wide fiscal expansion to stimulate its economy is impossible 
given that the European Central Bank (ECB) by mandate cannot bail out individual countries’ 
debts (as this would share the burden of the debt across the Euro area). This limits the E.U.’s 
options, keeping austerity as a focus even as the value of the fiscal multiplier turned out to be 
much higher than expected, hence augmenting its cost on the economy.1 Attempts to resolve 
some of these holes are also not attaining their goals, such as the Fiscal Compact of 2012 that 
replaced the Stability and Growth Pact but is producing similar results, or the Banking Union of 
2012 to decrease risks within the E.U. banking sector through deposit insurance for the 
eurozone amidst a full fledged banking crisis. While not entirely the E.U.’s fault, it suffers from 
frequently being a scapegoat in domestic politics which further hurts its case. To be fair, the 
E.U.’s attempts came much too late (Banking Union) and may have needed to have been 
implicit from the onset.2 Nonetheless, the consequence is that the economic divergences 
between countries have been accentuated since the financial crisis, and with little sign of
 (Leigh, Daniel; Blanchard, Olivier J 2013)1
 (Beck, Thorsten 2012, Elliot, DJ 2012)2
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improvement in future. In fact, the E.U. is in 
much worse shape economically than other 
first-world countries. Figure 1.1 shows the 
divergence in economic output following 2008, 
showing clearly that while some countries are 
in recovery, others have experienced a 
‘double-dip’ recession and are still struggling to 
recover.
The E.U. has been further strained by the 
massive influx of migrants coming from the 
Middle East and Africa. This developed into a 
full crisis in the summer and early fall of 2015 
with over 8,000 people landing on European shores each day.  As of June 2017, 1,688,755 3
migrants have reached Europe, according to the United Nations Human Rights Council, with 
several hundred thousand awaiting their chance to risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea.  A further 14,379 migrants are known to have died or are missing in the Mediterranean 4
since 2014, and there may be many others unreported.  Each year these numbers increase. 5
The inrush of migrants seemed to have attenuated a little following a controversial agreement 
between the E.U. and Turkey in March of 2016 which effectively closed the Balkan route into 
Western Europe, yet the other main route, through Libya, may be picking up again as the 
season gets warmer. In fact, on the twenty-seventh of June, 2017, 12,000 refugees landed on 
Italian shores in the span of forty-eight hours.  While not posing a significant economic cost onto 6
E.U. countries, this crisis has had strong political consequences. The E.U. has not been very 
forthcoming in providing aid to countries like Greece and Italy in their humanitarian efforts to 
rescue incoming boats, even when the leaders of these countries publicly called upon other 
countries for help. The E.U. operations to patrol its borders, namely Operation Triton through 
Frontex (the E.U. Border and Coast Guard Agency) reduced the area to be patrolled.  This may 7
result in many more deaths in the Mediterranean that go unreported. Moreover, the recent 
problems regarding the redistribution of migrants across the twenty-eight member-states have 
further called attention to the E.U.’s ability to manage the crisis equitably.
This apparent failure of the E.U. in handling the aforementioned crises together has strongly 
influenced the rise of far-right and populist parties across the European continent, which can 
have a huge impact on local politics, and ultimately back to the E.U. Marine Le Pen (France), 
Geert Wilders (The Netherlands) and Norbert Hofer (Austria) all produced stunning political 
campaigns in 2016-2017, attaining record results and coming close to winning Presidential 
elections in their countries by running on anti-E.U. rhetoric and boosting citizens’ fear of 
 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-343567583
 http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean4
 https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean5
 http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/06/28/news/migranti_italia_ue_sbarchi-169383917/6
 (European Commission 2016)7
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Figure 1.1: Real GDP of some E.U. countries 
2005-2015. Source: Eurostat.
migrants. The Italian eurosceptic movement Movimento 5 Stelle has been on-and-off the largest 
party in Italy for the last few months. Several studies find that immigration was the major factor 
in the victory of the Brexit referendum the 26th of June, 2016. The decision to trigger Article 50 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the E.U. by British Prime Minister Theresa May therefore is 
the concretization of the populist wave, and reveals the danger it poses to the E.U.’s integration.
At this point, two overarching questions arise. Firstly, what is the direction of the E.U.? An apt 
metaphor is that of a reeling boxer— will the E.U. be able to shoulder the brunt of these crises 
and come out in one piece, or will they push it over? An important factor bearing on the outcome 
is whether the economic divergence between member-states is increasing or decreasing. 
Secondly, since any progress towards resolving these problems seems to be stagnating, could 
a new direction provide a solution?
This thesis will unfold in the following manner. Firstly, I will outline the possible paths ahead for 
the E.U., focussing in particular on the ‘two-speed’ Europe option because it appears to be the 
most likely, with cooperation envisaged in the areas of E.U. defense and border control. Given 
the disparate economic performances which characterizes the E.U., a multi-speed framework 
could be applied to the economic sector where countries freed from blanket E.U. policies can 
target economic policy to match performance. I describe in some depth the current, intrinsic, 
‘two-speed’ framework that exists in the E.U. and identify some of the difficulties it has 
encountered (namely political will and a form of social pressure) that undermine its success, 
ultimately rendering it unconvincing. Instead, I develop a new approach based solely on 
economic performance by adapting the preexisting Proust Index devised by The Economist. 
The results reveal two groups of similarly performing E.U. countries, one that has recovered well 
from the economic crisis of 2007-2008 and the other that has not, and that the significant gap in 
performance between the two groups is increasing. This worsening imbalance suggests that 
urgent action needs to be taken whichever future E.U. option is followed.
1.2  BACKGROUND
The Brexit referendum outcome of June 2016 provided a strong impetus for the E.U.’s leaders 
to explore a new direction, especially in light of the growing support for anti-E.U. candidates in 
the Dutch, Austrian and French elections. In March of 2017, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President 
of the European Commission, published a White Paper in which he outlined five options for the 
future of the E.U. These include : 8
I. simply continuing the current framework, accepting the at-times lack of ambition and 
will; 
 (European Commission 2017)8
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II. a unwinding of E.U. integration by returning to focus solely on the single market: current 
policies on common employment and social standards, internal and external security 
cooperation, and cooperation within the eurozone are dropped along with any effort 
towards achieving these;
III. a major increase in integration for the entirety of the E.U. (minus the United Kingdom) 
by 2025;
IV. ‘doing less more efficiently’ by increasing cooperation for all members only in specific 
areas where more value can be gained such as defense, common foreign policy and 
border control, while maintaining or reducing it in others where not much more can be 
gained such as in the common currency or single market; 
V. creating areas of disparate integration where countries voluntarily chose whether to 
integrate more in particular sectors.
The last of these, which entails the creation of a two-speed Europe, is the one which has been 
picking up the most traction. A revival of an old idea within the realm of E.U. studies, it was first 
raised towards the end of the 1980’s by Germany Chancellor Helmut Kohl who is famously 
quoted for saying “the slowest ship in the convoy should not be allowed to determine its 
speed”.  His thought became a 1989 proposal in which the then twelve European Community 9
(EC) members would be separated into “concentric circles” around a core of the original six 
members.  However, it remained a proposal that never took off. A few years later, the prospect 10
of Eastern Enlargement following the end of the Cold War, and the expected associated 
obstacles to decision making on the European level, gave new support for this idea. In a 1994 
paper, prominent German Christian Democrats Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers argued 
that core countries of Europe should not be hindered by slower performing countries, but 
instead free to perform and in doing so the more powerful economies would exert a force on the 
periphery by pulling them up. Although this proposal is supposed to work in principle to the favor 
of both ‘groups’, it too did not take off. Since then the idea of a multi-speed Europe is mentioned 
very little both in economic and political science literature, and by E.U. leaders. Some, like 
former Italian and European Commission leader Romani Prodi, believe that it already exists 
within the E.U., albeit unofficially, and have been urging its official implementation for years.  11
Others, like Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, have long argued for two different European 
currencies to better match the different economic performance of the eurozone countries.  12
 (Watts, Duncan 2008)9
 (Mertes, Michael; Prill, Norbert J; Michael Mertes, Kurt Plück, Norbert J. Prill, Hans-Peter Schwarz und Werner 10
Weidenfeld, 1990)
 http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2017-03-17/prodi-si-doppia-velocita-ma-senza-escludere-11
nessuno-115619.shtml?uuid=AExIpRo; http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/05/09/news/
romano_prodi_dalla_francia_svolta_storica_merkel_non_decide_piu_da_sola_-165015437/; http://www.unita.tv/
focus/prodi-leuropa-a-due-velocita-e-quello-che-volevo-sentire-brava-merkel/; https://euobserver.com/
institutional/14575
 https://www.ft.com/content/dbbd151c-62f4-11e6-8310-ecf0bddad227?mhq5j=e212
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Although a concerted effort to develop the two-speed proposal is lacking, multi-speeds are 
nevertheless implicit within the E.U. framework. 
In 2017, several heads of state willing to strengthen E.U. integration have come out in support 
of a multi-speed framework, most notably Germany’s Merkel,  Italy’s Gentiloni  and France’s 13 14
Macron.  Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg too are in favor of such a measure.  15 16
However, the leaders of Finland,  Poland,  Czech Republic  and Hungary  are publicly 17 18 19 20
opposed, feeling that it would significantly penalize those not part of the core group.  What is 21
certain is that at this point there is currently no clear definition of how the multi-speed framework 
would be decided. So far, the rhetoric from E.U. leaders has been that two groups would be 
decided based on will, with those who want increased cooperation voluntarily banding together 
while those who want less Europe form their own group.  However, along this definition, the 22
aforementioned countries are already part of one of the E.U.’s ‘faster tracks’ in terms of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the eurozone. In other words, the new ‘increased 
integration’ group would be made up by the same countries in which problems persist.
Furthermore, the E.U. legal framework already defines ways to form groups of increased 
integration within the E.U. One such way is called Enhanced Cooperation and was established 
by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. As the name suggests, this clause legally allows at least nine 
E.U. countries to integrate more in particular fields within the E.U.’s institutions. Another involves 
Opt-Out clauses that any member-state can use to avoid participating in a E.U. treaty or law if 
they are unwilling to integrate further. This means they can back out of E.U. treaties or laws 
without blocking it for the signatories, in essence creating a group with greater integration. While 
not directly used to form groups, it is an incentive for groups of countries to do so anyway since 
they know other countries can just opt out if unwilling. Therefore, it acts as a facilitator for the 
formation of groups, such as the two speeds proposal. This is the case with the fiscal policy 
coordination treaties external to the E.U. framework like the Stability and Growth Pact and the 
Fiscal Compact, the latter of which is currently in force and excludes the UK and the Czech 
Republic, and the Schengen Area which does not include the UK and Ireland. Finally, to a lesser 
extent the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification can establish variable speeds within the 
E.U. This instrument kicks in if new or acceding states have not met certain standards regarding 
the internal market or ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ policies to help them attain these as 
quickly as possible. To do so, the Commission derogates related parts of the E.U.’s acquis 
 https://www.ft.com/content/725ec0bc-b091-11e1-8b36-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e2&mhq5j=e213
 http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2017/03/10/multi-speed-eu-needed-says-14
gentiloni-2_56948c3a-7dc5-4136-87b0-93feb2aae11e.html
 http://www.euractiv.fr/section/elections/news/macron-assume-une-europe-a-plusieurs-vitesses/15
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/14/plans-for-two-speed-eu-risk-split-with-peripheral-members16
 http://www.politico.eu/article/juha-sipila-finnish-pm-against-junckers-two-speed-eu-scenario-white-paper/17
 http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-poland-eu-kaczynski-idUKKBN16R1NV18
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/14/plans-for-two-speed-eu-risk-split-with-peripheral-members19
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/14/plans-for-two-speed-eu-risk-split-with-peripheral-members20
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/14/plans-for-two-speed-eu-risk-split-with-peripheral-members21
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/14/plans-for-two-speed-eu-risk-split-with-peripheral-members22
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communautaire for the member-state in question until the requirements are satisfied. For 
example, if an acceding or new member-state has combustion plants as a part of their 
production chain, E.U. environmental policy can be abridged for a short time to allow the country 
time to transition away from them. Essentially, the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification 
can act as a temporary Opt-Out clause. The maps in Figure 1.2 depict some of the areas of 
further integration that exist today.
In theory, the current forms of enhanced integration seek to overcome the obstacles to 
integration posed by individual countries, but ultimately work in the long run to increase 
integration for the E.U. as a whole. This is done by promulgating the process that created the 
E.U. of today: Jean Monnet’s Method. Embodying the neofunctionalist view in social science, 
Monnet’s ‘petits pas’ approach achieves regional integration through functional spillover 
dynamics: an imbalance in a specific policy sector would be resolved only by more integration 
since going backwards would be more costly, which in turn would create another imbalance and 
so forth.  An example of this is the removal of tariffs for goods traded inside the European 23
Economic Community (EEC) leading to a harmonization of national regulations and tax laws.  24
By allowing several countries to integrate more in a specific policy area, this creates regional 
imbalance than can only be settled with having the remaining countries join, as rolling back the 
integration would be costly in terms of credibility.
 (Moravcsik, Andrew 2005)23
 (Moravcsik, Andrew 2005, Mansour, Nisreen 2011)24
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Figure 1.2: Maps highlighting the various intrinsic ‘two-speeds’ of the E.U. From the top, left to right, 
these are: the E.U., eurozone, Schengen Area, Single Resolution Mechanism (in the Banking Union), 
Common Security and Defense Policy, and Fiscal Compact countries. Created with MapChart.net ©
At the same time, these pre-existing ways to enhance cooperation within the E.U. have not 
been very successful, perhaps even harming the solidity of the E.U. and the success of 
Monnet’s Method. Enhanced Cooperation has been used sparsely, touching only the areas of 
divorce laws,  international couples’ property rights,  patents  and taxes on financial 25 26 27
transactions.  In terms of Opt-Outs, this method can undermine E.U. integration by 28
promulgating the notion of E.U. ‘à la carte’. In other words, by allowing countries to avoid 
agreements which they do not want, including ones of major significance to the E.U., these 
modifications set a precedent for other countries and, in a way, defeat the purpose of the 
European community as countries freely only act in their favor. Thus, E.U. member-states can 
take into serious consideration pursuing policies that interest them rather than committing fully 
to E.U. integration. In the past, Ireland held a referendum regarding the Lisbon Treaty and 
initially voted against it.  On the second round of negotiations, however, the Lisbon Treaty was 29
passed.  Similarly, the UK and Ireland have opted out of the Schengen Agreement,  and 30 31
Denmark has opted out of any defense agreement.  These actions show that there is a 32
significant political fracturing within the E.U.
One of the current forms of enhanced integration involves fiscal cooperation between twenty-six 
member-states of the E.U., and is essential for the proper functioning of the EMU. This is 
delineated by the Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact. In their article The Stability 
Pact: More than a Minor Nuisance?, Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz highlight some of 
their advantages, including the prevention of inflationary debt bailouts, neutralizing inflationary 
pressure, offsetting political bias towards excessive deficits, internalizing international interest 
rate spillovers and encouraging policy coordination.  However, it is also widely recognized that 33
these have not succeeded in their aims.  Eichengreen and Wyplosz argue that the Pact 34
obstacles one of the most important, and inevitable reforms that the E.U. faces— pension 
reform. Considering the change in demographics in terms of increase in longevity and a 
reduction in birth rates throughout most European nations, the level of tax that is required to 
service these obligations would require governments to borrow more. However, the Stability and 
Growth Pact on paper binds signatory governments to keeping their budget deficits within 3% of 
GDP and public debt below 60% of GDP (after which point they become excessive), which 
would limit how much governments could meet the pension demand especially with less 
children being born that eventually pay taxes. Similarly, for countries with an already high deficit, 
such overarching fiscal policies could also prevent the full functioning of automatic stabilizers in 
 (Council Regulation 2010)25
 (Fabbrini, Federico 2015)26
 (European Union 2012)27
 (Council Of The European Union 2013)28
 (Council of the European Union 2009)29
 (Council of the European Union 2009)30
 http://www.politico.eu/article/expanding-schengen-outside-the-union/31
 (Danish Ministry of Defence 2016)32
 (Eichengreen, Barry; Wyplosz, Charles 1998)33
 (Mortensen, Jørgen Birk 2013)34
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times of economic downswing as these increase government deficits in the short run.  35
Furthermore, under the Pact the targets for public debt and deficits have been largely ignored. 
The compliance to the subsequent Fiscal Compact, which replaced and slightly expanded the 
scope of the Stability and Growth Pact, similarly failed as out of the twenty-five signatories only 
four adhered to the criteria.36
The associated enforcement mechanism, the Excessive Debt Procedure (EDP), was not 
enough to keep countries within the requirements: as senior researcher at the Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Jørgen Mortensen, puts it, the mechanism was originally only 
intended as a form of “effective peer pressure”.  Sanctions under the EDP have never been 37
exercised even while the majority of E.U. countries do not meet the required debt and deficit 
conditions. For example, in 2002 and 2003 Germany and France respectively were running 
budget deficits higher than the Pact would allow.  Even after the Council provided 38
recommendations for reducing this and, seeing no change, proceeded to vote for sanctions, 
qualified majority was not met and thus these countries were not sanctioned.  Because of the 39
enforcement mechanism’s difficulties, while there may be a publicly manifested desire for fiscal 
cooperation, the results have been well below the goal.
In their article entitled Fiscal Discipline as a Social Norm: The Stability Pact, economists Jean-
Paul Fitoussi and Francesco Saraceno bring up the very interesting notion of the ratification of 
the Stability Pact being just a public social norm that E.U. countries are compelled to follow to 
explain the aforementioned failures of the Stability and Growth Pact.  They take a view from 40
social psychology according to which the need for social acceptance determines individual 
behavior. Because of this necessity, a tendency to conform emerges and is reinforced both by 
the risk of punishment in case of deviation and by a social context in which other people comply. 
More to the point, this view posits that people may follow social norms even if it is against their 
best interest as long as the gain in reputation is greater than the cost they suffer. In other words, 
they ‘force’ themselves into a sub-optimal equilibrium with constraints on behavior. A very simple 
paragon in economics can be seen in firms choosing to pay wages greater than the market-
clearing wage because the cost is outweighed by the negative impact to their reputation that 
hurts their ability to attract essential workers. According to Fitoussi and Saraceno, this works 
just as well to describe the behavior of E.U. countries. The authors explain that the E.U. 
institutions and decisions are the outcome of bargaining, or consensus-building, between 
different governments. If a country wanted to push some negotiation, its bargaining power 
depends on its credibility: an integral part of its reputation. Not adhering to agreements like the 
Stability and Growth Pact would naturally erode their reputation with the other member-states 
and thus make it much harder for them to negotiate successfully in the future. This theory is 
 (Eichengreen, Barry; Wyplosz, Charles 1998)35
 (European Commission 2016)36
 (Mortensen, Jørgen Birk 2013)37
 (Mortensen, Jørgen Birk 2013)38
 (Mortensen, Jørgen Birk 2013)39
 (Fitoussi, Jean‐Paul; Saraceno, Francesco 2008)40
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confirmed by the weak EDP punishment where the Council can only resort to verbal 
reprimands. Fitoussi and Saraceno conclude therefore that any attempts to follow the social 
public norm are dictated by a fear of the potential social costs— by social recognition. The 
threat itself makes it rational for E.U. countries.
Within the current framework, Firoussi and Saraceno’s research suggests that the currently 
available measures to expand coordination may be less efficient in reality than on paper as 
countries feel a pronounced pressure when deciding whether to opt out of a policy or to take 
part in enhanced cooperation. Furthermore, within a two-speed Europe framework based on a 
will to integrate more, Fitoussi and Saraceno’s research casts significant doubts on the freedom 
that countries have in their choice to be part of a specific group compared to the alternative. In 
other words, if such a significant pressure distorts decisions, a sub-optimal arrangement will be 
achieved as all countries would feel forced to join the faster group for fear of losing bargaining 
power compared to the stronger economies. Were this to happen, such a two-speed Europe 
would not have the proper economic or political grounds to exist, impeding the appropriate 
solutions to be applied to the E.U. member-states’ divergent problems and would likely remain 
unstable in the long term. 
Another example of weak political commitments that the E.U. faces involves its budget, which 
stands currently at 1.24% of E.U. Gross National Product.  This sum is set by the Multiannual 41
Financial Framework, and any movement to increase it has been met with insurmountable 
obstacles.  Several studies have shown that this sum is well below what would be needed for 42
the E.U. to have any real impactful policies.  Although member-states expect the E.U. to 43
undertake certain projects, any step towards more supranationalism is met with strong 
resistance, especially in times of economic uncertainty and political turbulence. The E.U.’s 
initiatives are also at times met with strong dissent. This is particularly the case for matters on 
economic policy today, as the prolonged crisis wears down on people’s determination to stick 
with concerted policies like the single currency. The rise to prominence of eurosceptic political 
parties testifies this (Le Pen and the Movimento 5 Stelle have both promised referenda on 
leaving the eurozone in 2017 which, regardless of how serious they are, garner significant 
support in their constituencies ). This potentially narrows the scope of sectors in which a two-44
speed framework could be established politically. Nevertheless, the diverging economic 
necessities of E.U. countries could be met with a two-speed (or multi-speed) structure, and the 
prospect of coordination between objectively similarly performing countries may make this 
easier to achieve and potentially overcome the political problems mentioned above.
At the same time, the idea that many of the same member-states who are already part of more-
integrated groups within the E.U. would want to form a new, ‘further integration’ bloc based on 
 (Cipriani, Gabriele 2014)41
 (Benedetto, Giacomo; Milio, Simona 2012)42
 (Benedetto, Giacomo; Milio, Simona 2012)43
 http://www.lastampa.it/2016/12/08/italia/politica/di-battista-ms-vogliamo-un-referendum-sulleuro-44
BF20xZLJmONT1shm2ZcWdM/pagina.html; http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-economie/sueurs-froides-
face-a-la-sortie-de-l-euro-promise-par-le-pen-23-03-2017-6789189.php
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will alone does not seem practical. This is particularly the case if one considers the economic 
stagnation that is characterizing Europe and, more importantly, the increasingly pressing need 
to resolve this through uniform policies amidst significantly different (and diverging) economic 
performance. Perhaps these are the criteria that should be considered in a potential two-speed 
(or multi-speed) economic structure. In fact, if the point of this policy is to overcome the 
economic crisis, the decision of membership in one group or the other should be based upon 
that and not signify a lacking commitment to the European project. Rather, similar economic 
conditions that would lead to a newfound stability through appropriate policies should form the 
background of such a definition as anything else would maintain the current disequilibrium that 
is exacerbating divergences.
Without question, any form of modifying the European Union’s framework holds large economic, 
social, political, practical and bureaucratic consequences. If a two-speed solution were to fail, 
the uncertainty in financial markets may raise large opportunity costs that may very well not be 
recovered, resulting in a massive crisis of identity and of confidence in the E.U. and its 
institutions, and possibly a renewed economic recession. Such failure would very likely signal 
the end of the E.U. Furthermore, the political debate for such a policy, which would be intrinsic 
to the decision being taken in the first place, would be immense as twenty-eight (soon twenty-
seven) countries attempt to reach a unanimous agreement. How could member-states tell each 
other which group they think others should be in? Similarly, if one takes Fitoussi and Saraceno’s 
argument, the fear of losing bargaining power would distort the process in which countries make 
objective decisions on their own future. Objective economic criteria would be met head-on by 
political expectations which may make an evidence-based two-speed Europe more theoretical 
than realistic. Nevertheless, it could be that the prospect of a coordination based on similar 
countries would make this easier to achieve and potentially overcome the political problems 
mentioned above. If such a project were to be considered, evaluated and ultimately adopted as 
a potential solution to the aforementioned problems engulfing the E.U., a tangible and concrete 
definition mechanism needs to be determined. The scope of this thesis is to provide such a 
definition, which stems from specific findings and subsequent reasonings in time-series 
macroeconomic data about E.U. member-states.
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2.0  PROUST I INDEX
2.1  PROUST INDEX
In February of 2012, the British economics and finance weekly magazine The Economist 
published the results of a study quantifying the effects of the recent financial crisis. At the time, 
some advanced countries were beginning to slowly climb out of the recession, but the 
consequences had been so negative for others that no one was quite sure of the severity. The 
authors of the article devised a simple, yet comprehensive way to compare their day’s economy 
to the past. The metric, years lost, determines the name of this index by harking back to French 
novelist Marcel Proust’s famous novel À la recherche du temps perdu (In search of lost time). It 
is a particularly effective choice as it is easily understandable, and, more importantly, universal, 
allowing for straightforward comparisons between countries without having to recur to price 
indices or anything else which may distort data. This feature makes the so-called Proust Index 
unique, allowing for some profound findings.
The Proust Index matches a specific national parameter from a given year to its past values to 
see how it compares. It asks the following questions: does this year’s value suggest progress? 
Or, is there a time in the past when this value occurs, meaning that the country has regressed in 
between? If the former is true, then the country has improved on its past in the specific 
parameter. Instead, if the latter is the case, then any progress in between is essentially lost 
regardless of whether the trend is recovering (this is an important point which will be touched 
upon later). More specifically, starting from a specific ‘year zero’, the number of years counting 
backwards until the starting value is matched by a value in the past are added up. Because the 
role of The Economist’s article is to use the Proust Index to calculate the effects of the crisis for 
its modern day, their ‘year zero’ is 2012 (when the article came out). However, this Index can be 
based on any year. Among every parameter used and for most countries, a slowdown occurs 
following 2008. Countries then take different amounts of time to recover, and some even 
continue to worsen. In either case, recovery or lack thereof for each parameter is captured by 
the Proust Index in the form of years lost. To get its final value, the total amount of years lost per 
country is then divided by the number of parameters, thus giving an overall evaluation of at what 
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year the economy is operating at. In their study, The Economist takes its data from the OECD’s 
statistical database.
The seven variables that make up the Proust Index include: the value of housing, financial 
assets held by households, household wealth, household expenditure, wage levels, annual 
output and unemployment. The first five largely dictate living standards in their own way and 
also determine the demand for goods and services through their impact on people’s 
consumption choices. Annual output in real terms, on the other hand, quantifies the total 
production of an economy. If measured in real terms and by taking into account population 
growth, GDP it can also be used to examine the progression of living standards. Unemployment 
also influences standards of living, and is a consequence of the demand for goods that will 
cause firms to adjust their employee counts. In its entirety, the Proust Index’s parameters 
encompass a wide range of the overall economy. A detailed description of these, and their 
impacts, follows.
2.2  DESCRIPTION OF DATA
2.2.1  Household Wealth
In its all-encompassing form, household wealth aggregates measures of income, inter-
generational transfers, and any kind of asset held by the household, whether financial or 
physical (such as property) to measure economic wealth of households within a country. 
Essentially, this parameter reports the extent of domestic richness. However, household wealth 
can be simplified around two measures: the property price of a household’s main residence 
(HMR) and the total amount of financial assets held by them. This is because they are the 
largest components of domestic portfolios and are relatively easier to measure (albeit not 
without problems). 
Household wealth impacts the economy in four main ways. Firstly, it determines consumption 
expenditure. As income and gains from any held assets increase, household wealth also 
increases. Spending and saving consequently increase as people have either more money 
available or have a smaller proportion of their wealth tied to things like loans, healthcare or 
education. Furthermore, higher wealth also gives households a more comfortable lifestyle as 
they can afford to spend more, and on a wider range of goods including private healthcare, 
higher education and comfortable retirement. The entire economy benefits as aggregate 
demand for goods and services increases: as businesses face higher demand for their goods 
they may hire more workers, decreasing unemployment; and government receipts increases 
from higher sales tax revenue and lower spending on unemployment benefits. Wealthier 
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households are also better equipped to resist periods of economic instability or downturn.  The 45
second way in which household wealth impacts the economy regards the effect a change in 
asset prices (including those held by households) has on the demand for investment through 
the Tobin’s Q effect. This theory posits that an increase in asset prices decreases the cost of 
capital, thus increasing investment demand. ,  Finally, higher household wealth instills 46 47
confidence in private expenditure.48
2.2.2  House Cost
In a 2014 study for the European Central Bank titled Household wealth in the euro area: The 
importance of intergenerational transfers, homeownership and house price dynamics, 
economists Thomas Y. Mathä, Alessandro Propiglia and Michel Ziegelmeyer study the impacts 
of one of the two main components of household wealth on the economy. Their research looks 
at three particular factors for wealth accumulation — home-ownership, housing value increases, 
and intergenerational transfers — and their effect on the marked differences of household 
wealth across the euro area (and the E.U. as a whole). The authors find that a vast majority of 
households in the euro area own a house. The highest percentage is in Slovakia (90%), 
followed by Spain (83%) and Slovenia (82%). Only Germany (42%) and Austria (48%) are 
below 50%.  For the vast majority of European homeowners, the value of their HMR accounts 49
for around 50% of their household wealth portfolio, thus making it their most valuable and 
important asset.50
Homeownership is an important asset for the vast majority of people in the euro-area. The 
government provides significant incentives to own a house through subsidies and tax-deductible 
interest-rate payments on mortgages, thus facilitating acquisition. More to the point, housing 
prices generally appreciate since land prices predominantly increase over time, thus making 
owning a house a rather safe source of capital gains in the long-run. This is compounded by the 
fact that housing is relatively low-risk in terms of shock exposure.  All of this contributes to 51
making housing a more attractive option compared to financial investments which can be more 
volatile and more complicated to manage. The authors also find that house appreciation is 
especially important in countries where government pension plans are low or at risk of being 
reduced. Therefore, house ownership becomes a crucial aspect for household economic 
stability and for making sure living standards are decent over the long-term. Controlling for 
 (Organisatie voor Economische Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling 2013)45
 (Brainard, W. C.; Tobin, J. 1968)46
 (Sousa, Ricardo M 2009) Furthermore, as wealth increases the price of collateral also increases, which positively 47
aﬀects companies’ and households’ balance sheets. This is also known as the credit channel. Investment risk and 
adverse selection are subsequently lessened.
 (Sousa, Ricardo M 2009)48
 (Mathä, Thomas; Porpiglia, Alessandro; Ziegelmeyer, Michael 2014)49
 (Mathä, Thomas; Porpiglia, Alessandro; Ziegelmeyer, Michael 2014)50
 (Mathä, Thomas; Porpiglia, Alessandro; Ziegelmeyer, Michael 2014)51
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income and any kind of transfer, the study finds that a German household that acquired their 
HMR in 2000 had a 9.2% higher median net wealth in 2014.  Similarly, albeit at a significantly 52
slower pace, an Italian household that acquired their HMR in 1990 had a 6.2% higher median 
net wealth wealth in 2010.  Another study by economists Christopher D. Carroll, Misuzu 53
Otsuka, and Jirka Slacalek, measures the effect housing wealth (property price) has on 
aggregate consumption to be two cents on a one dollar change in the short term, and nine cents 
in the long term.  In other words, as housing wealth increases by one dollar, consumption 54
increases by two cents in the following quarter and by nine cents in the long term. 
As house ownership can provide significant benefits through its appreciation, a depreciation can 
have opposite, and potentially catastrophic, consequences. Furthermore, since around half of 
households’ wealth portfolios are tied up in the cost of the house, if a depreciation were to occur 
while the rest (i.e. financial assets) increase or stay the same, a greater proportion of their 
wealth is tied up in less safe assets. Thus, a larger part of their economic well-being becomes 
at-risk during economic downturns. For example, when financial asset prices decrease as a 
consequence of a recession, households whose assets were less at risk should maintain a 
greater level of wealth. They would be able to sell their house without too big of a cost while any 
financial asset they sell will have lost more. However, if this ratio is inverted and the value of the 
house instead makes up a smaller percentage of wealth, then households are much more at 
risk of losing a larger portion of wealth during economic downturns. Were household wealth to 
fall, negative effects along the aforementioned four channels to the economy would be 
triggered. This becomes particularly problematic in the case of a confluence of other negative 
macroeconomic conditions such as decreases in real wages or increases in unemployment and 
government debt.
2.2.3  Financial Assets
In another European Central Bank Working Paper from 2009, economist Ricardo M. Sousa 
examines the individual impact of financial wealth (financial assets minus liabilities, excluding 
mortgages) on consumption expenditure. Just like for the Proust Index, my thesis will focus on 
the asset part of the financial balance sheet of households only, which encompasses currency 
and deposits, shares in equity and investment funds, pension funds and life insurance according 
to Eurostat, the European Commission’s Statistics Agency. In a 2009 working paper entitled 
Wealth Effects on Consumption, Ricardo Sousa, an economist for the European Central Bank, 
finds that financial assets are consistently much greater than liabilities, across both time and the 
E.U.’s member-states. In fact, the proportion of financial assets out of total financial assets and 
liabilities has been on average 75% for the E.U. as a whole since 2000.  Among the member-55
 (Mathä, Thomas; Porpiglia, Alessandro; Ziegelmeyer, Michael 2014)52
 (Mathä, Thomas; Porpiglia, Alessandro; Ziegelmeyer, Michael 2014)53
 (Carroll, Christopher D; Otsuka, Misuzu; Slacalek, Jiri 2011)54
 (EUROSTAT 2017)55
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states this ranges from a 
minimum of 62% in Ireland to a 
maximum of 84% in Belgium 
(Figure 2.1).  So, an increase 56
by one euro in financial assets 
will raise financial wealth by 
0.75 euros, liabilities held 
constant.
Consistent with several other 
studies, Sousa finds the effect 
o f fi n a n c i a l a s s e t s o n 
aggregate consumption to be 
greater than that of housing 
wealth. Conducted in a similar 
fashion to the housing wealth 
studies mentioned above, the 
author measures the marginal propensity to consume from an increase in financial assets of 
one euro to be around 3.5 cents.  This is confirmed by economist Frauke Skudelny in a study 57
published in 2009.  Put another way, a 10% increase in financial asset wealth leads to a 58
consequent consumption increase between 0.6% and 1.5%.  The author also finds that 59
consumption is particularly sensitive to financial liabilities, the other aspect of the financial 
balance sheet. This last observation ties directly into the discussion on the risks of greater 
vulnerability of wealth mentioned above: the more household wealth is exposed on financial 
markets, the greater the potential effect on consumption.
At the same time, there is some controversy regarding the impact of certain financial assets 
held by households on investment demand (the Tobin’s Q effect mentioned above). In particular, 
Stephen Wright, an economist at the University of London’s Birkbeck College, finds that the 
calculation of Tobin’s Q (the ratio between the tangible asset market value of a firm, which is 
made up of employment, physical capital, inventory and property, and the replacement value of 
these)  cannot include any non-residential fixed asset held by households.  Namely, this 60 61
means that their impact on investment demand is reduced. Nevertheless, financial assets 
remain an important source of wealth for households and a barometer of economic health.
 (EUROSTAT 2017)56
 (Sousa, Ricardo M 2009)57
 (Skudelny, Frauke 2009)58
 (Sousa, Ricardo M 2009)59
 (Brainard, W. C.; Tobin, J. 1968)60
 (Wright, S. 2006)61
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Figure 2.1: Average financial assets as a percentage of total financial assets 
and liabilities from 2005-2015 in the E.U. Source: Eurostat.
2.2.4  Household Expenditure
Household expenditure, also called consumer spending, is one of the most important 
components of GDP. It measures the final spending by households on goods and services to 
satisfy individual and family needs, along with those of members of their community.  A 62
decrease in consumption spending can have immediate negative consequences on the 
economy through the form of slowed economic growth. In particular, as consumption decreases, 
the demand for these goods and services decreases and so prices will fall, also known as 
deflation. In theory, were this the case consumption would slow down even more as people 
anticipate lower prices and so wait to spend, thus resulting in a negative spiral. The subsequent 
drops in production would lead firms to hire less people, and those remaining without a job 
would need unemployment benefits. However, government revenue would also suffer as tax 
revenue on consumption decreases, making it harder for them to meet this new need. If 
decreased consumption occurs for two quarters in a row, the economy would be considered to 
be in a recession. Conversely, if household expenditure were to significantly increase and 
consumer demand is greater than what firms can produce, this would in theory result in an 
increase in price, or inflation. Similarly to above, people would consider future prices, which in 
this case would be higher, and so would spend more currently. As aggregate demand increases 
further, prices would increase even more and another type of spiral occurs. These threats are 
what drive central banks’ mandate to contain inflation. 
It is unclear whether The Economist use nominal or real data for household expenditure. I 
decided to use nominal data because, as was the case with total financial assets parameter, a 
specific deflator was not included in the dataset.
2.2.5  Wages
Wages are an intrinsic component to the labor market. They determine firms’ demand for 
workers and also workers’ supply of their time. They also contribute to the amount of disposable 
income that households have to spend or save. In real terms, an increase in wages leads to 
higher purchasing power and thus better standards of living, on average. Rising real wages lead 
to more spending, and the positive impacts mentioned above occur. The government 
subsequently gains higher tax revenues from more sales, thus decreasing its necessity to 
borrow and its deficit spending. Wages are also a indicator of competitiveness (in addition to the 
cost of capital, productivity and innovation) in that they are the largest cost to the firm  — lower 63
wages lead to cheaper production costs and thus more competitive goods.
 (Eurostat 2016)62
 (Stuchlik, A. 2015)63
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On the other hand, a decrease in wages could carry an important role for reducing 
macroeconomic imbalances and resolve problems in other sectors, at least in theory. The main 
idea behind this, internal devaluation, is one of the underlying tools that the eurozone has to 
minimize growth divergences now that countries no longer have control of their monetary policy. 
It posits that competitiveness vis-à-vis other countries can be boosted by having individual 
deficit countries unilaterally decrease their unit-labor costs (of which wages form the largest 
part). As a consequence, these countries’ goods will be more competitive and thus their market 
share will increase, restoring growth. This is especially important for countries that depended 
greatly on currency devaluation prior to the euro such as Italy, Greece and Spain. In order for 
internal devaluation to work fully, countries doing well need to also increase their wages and 
make their goods less competitive, and so give up some of their market share to deficit-
countries. A ‘flexibilitization’ of labor markets that allows firms to easily lower and raise wages in 
all of the eurozone is integral to this neoliberal theory. Much research has come out recently that 
challenges this theory and its likelihood of resolving the eurozone’s divergences.64
2.2.6  Unemployment Rate
The unemployment rate measures the percentage of people old enough to work that are not 
currently employed (in the last reference week), are actively looking for employment and that 
are available to work starting within the next two weeks, out of the entire workforce (which 
includes employed and unemployed people).  In 2015, it was significantly higher in the E.U. 65
(9.39%) than in the US (5.29%), and since then the gap has largely remained the same.  The 66
economic significance of unemployment is twofold: firstly, unemployed people gain no income, 
reducing their living standards and their expenditure; and secondly, the government offers 
benefits to help maintain unemployed people while also raising no tax revenue from them in 
terms of income tax. Being unemployed also eliminates contributions to pensions and social 
security. If workers are unemployed for an extended amount of time, such as half a year, a 
United States Federal Reserve study shows that income will be less thirty years later.  67
Similarly, being unemployed also impacts people’s ability to own a house in the future.68
Interestingly enough, a study shows that in Portugal and Greece, a high unemployment rate 
could have induced a short run positive effect by lowering wage inequality.  While decreasing 69
wage inequality through increasing unemployment is most likely not a desired course of action, 
this is nonetheless important because wage inequality is found to have a significant impact on 
 (Armingeon, Klaus; Baccaro, Lucio 2012, De Grauwe, Paul 2012)64
 (Eurostat 2016)65
 (OECD 2016)66
 (Cooper, D 2014)67
 (Cooper, D 2014)68
 (Dreger, Christian; López-Bazo, Enrique; Ramos, Raul; Royuela, Vicente; Suriñach, Jordi 2015)69
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growth (more on this in Chapter Three), and the E.U. countries that have high unemployment 
rates are also having problems with growth.
2.2.7  Annual Output
Finally, the most common way to measure annual output is through Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). This parameter computes the total value of all final goods and services produced in a 
country in a given period. In nominal terms, the annual prices of the final goods and services are 
those of the current market value, while in real terms a base year’s prices are used for each 
basket of goods and services. Both of these have different draws. Nominal GDP, which includes 
inflation, can convey other viewpoints such as debt sustainability: debts are set in a passed time 
so economic growth and inflation contribute to its future value. Real GDP instead isolates 
annual output from changes in prices through a specified deflator, thus focusing on the changes 
in production over time. At the same time, it is important to note that neither voluntary household 
work nor the adverse impacts of economic activity, such as negative externalities on the 
environment, are included in the GDP measure. This makes the annual output parameter 
marginally incomplete, but overall it is comprehensive enough to capture differences over time 
in annual output.
When real GDP increases, firms tend to hire more workers, who have more money to spend or 
save, and unemployment decreases. Conversely, when real GDP decreases the opposite 
occurs.
2.3  METHODOLOGY
In order to see how much progress countries have made since 2012, an updated version of the 
Proust Index was needed. However, given the expanded role it would have in informing the 
separation of countries into potential groups in a two-speed Europe based on economic 
performance, I implemented a few minor changes, both in variables and in methodology. To 
begin, the data used came from another source, Eurostat, rather than the OECD’s statistical 
database. This is because the latter does not include data for several E.U. member-states, and 
in this thesis I look at the entirety of the E.U. as opposed to just advanced economies. 
Furthermore, the household wealth parameter was dropped because its aggregates – house 
cost, financial assets held by households and real wages – make up such a large percentage of 
it (see above for further description). In the original Proust Index article, it is unclear how annual 
output was measured. For the sake of the updated index, annual output is covered amply by 
GDP in real terms. While interesting on its own, nominal GDP’s interpretation on debt 
sustainability alone does not complete the debt sustainability dimension, so it was omitted. The 
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article similarly does not explain how to deal with volatile data during the years of the crisis 
when measuring years lost. In other words, simply finding the first prior year where the same 
value is found and calculating the difference with the ‘year zero’ may betray the fact that more 
progress occurred before and should be counted. This refers to double-peak (or double-
minimum in the case of unemployment) situations where the first peak essentially hides the 
second. As such, an element of qualitative analysis through actively choosing to skip this 
volatility and look back to pre-2007 is needed to capture the real amount of years lost.
Because of missing data, part of Romania’s and Poland’s time series on the value of houses 
were modeled based on other countries’ performance. To do so, I looked at all other countries in 
the same dataset who had the same value at the same year and averaged the number of years 
it took them to get there from what the ‘year zero’ value was. Each average was comprised of 
several member-states geographically spread across the E.U.
To account for these changes, I devised a new version of the Proust Index, from now on called 
‘Proust I Index’, which also used 2012 as a ‘year zero’. The most consistent recent data from 
Eurostat dates to 2015, so this was the other year for which years lost were calculated to see 
whether countries progressed or regressed. The updated and expanded role of the new Proust I 
Index requires a metric to differentiate countries. The original Proust Index just looks at years 
lost without considering whether trends are improving or not. For example, a country that, 
according to the Proust Index, has lost several years in one parameter due to a significant initial 
deterioration, but whose trend into ‘year zero’ is improving, cannot be considered the same as 
another country who has the same number of years lost, but which reached the ‘year zero’ level 
after steadily worsening. In other words, relying solely on years lost as a metric can give an 
inaccurate representation of countries’ performance and so, within a context of forming groups, 
would be misleading. Similarly, a country that has relatively constant data can experience 
several years lost due to a small worsening. While this may be contrary to its historical trend, it 
does not entail the same gravity as another country that has lost much more actual progress.
For this, a specific process was devised to understand the divergent macroeconomic 
performance within the E.U. Eventually to be separated into two groups, countries’ behavior was 
ranked into six different categories which took into consideration the amount of years lost first, a 
comparison with the E.U.’s average for that parameter second, and finally compared the 
percentage change over the 2012-2015 period. The categories ranged from:
I. Dark green (best performance): 0 years lost in 2015, 2015 value significantly better 
than EU28 average, comparatively very strong growth
II. Light green (good performance): 0 or close to 0 years lost in 2015, 2015 value better 
than EU28, comparatively strong growth
III. Light blue (borderline tending towards green countries’ performance): comparatively 
few years lost, around EU28 average but positive growth trend: not concerning
IV. Dark blue (borderline tending towards red countries’ performance): comparatively few 
years lost, around EU28 average but negative growth trend: concerning
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V. Light red (bad performance): comparatively numerous years lost, lower than EU28 
average, negative growth trend
VI. Dark red (worst performance): comparatively most years lost, lower than EU28 
average, negative growth trend
These steps contribute to comprehensively extrapolating the divergences within the countries’ 
data, grounding the separation of countries based on performance in quantitative analysis. 
Ultimately, the classifications across parameters are summed to get a final grouping.
2.4  FINDINGS
The findings of the Proust I Index were strong. The table for years lost is reproduced in Figure 
2.2, along with some simple statistical analysis.
These results show that in 2012 the distribution of years lost is rather normal. The bin size, 
three, represents the size of the data and the range of years lost well. The standard deviation in 
2012 is under three, with a mean and median of lost years around four and a half countries. The 
maximum amount of years lost occurred in Greece with 10.33 years, followed by Portugal 
(9.67), Spain (8.33), Ireland (8.17) and Italy (7.0). At the other end of the spectrum, the best 
performers were Germany, which lost none, along with Austria and Malta (0.83 years each), 
Belgium (1.17), Slovakia (2.17), and Finland, Luxembourg and Bulgaria (2.5 years each). The 
Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Poland, Lithuania and Sweden also performed comparatively 
well, losing less than both the mean and the median. However, above the median lie seventeen 
countries, more than half of the E.U. In particular, the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece and Spain) fair the worst. Compared to The Economist’s original Proust Index findings, 
the Proust I Index’s 2012 results are largely similar. Germany remains the country with the least 
amount of years lost (at three), and Greece the one with the most years lost (fourteen). Spain’s 
lost economic time (eight), along with Portugal’s (slightly under ten) are confirmed.  A few 70
countries’ values were slightly higher, such as for Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland (eight, 
eight and nine, respectively).  Some of the differences could be traced back to the different 71
dataset, the omission of the household wealth variable, and the focus on real GDP. Overall 
however, the comparison between the two is quite good.
For 2015, some important changes appear. To begin, the Proust I Index’s results approximate a 
normal distribution to a lesser extent. With more data and maybe a more sophisticated model 
for selecting the bin size (the same one as above is used), perhaps the distribution would be 
smoother. Nevertheless, given the sample size, it is still somewhat normal. The standard 
 http://www.economist.com/node/2154825570
 http://www.economist.com/node/2154825571
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deviation increases to 3.67, meaning that there is a wider spread of data. The mean also 
increases to over 5, yet the median decreases to 4.08. This suggests that some countries have 
lost quite a few more years. In fact, the range increases from a minimum 0 (Germany) to a 
maximum of 14.67 (Greece). Several countries worsened, such as Croatia (losing 2.5 more 
years to a total of 8.5) and Cyprus (lost 5.3 more years to 9.8), which lost more than any other 
E.U. country. The PIIGS countries continued to worsen. On the other hand, the UK (down four 
years to 2.5) improved significantly, placing as one of the best performing countries after being 
largely above the E.U. mean in 2012. Finland had the opposite path as it lost 3.5 more years (up 
from 2.17 to 5.67), going from largely below the 2012 E.U. average to above it in 2015, 
especially the median. To a lesser extent, Sweden, Latvia and Lithuania exhibited a modest 
recovery of around two years. Given the economic stagnation following 2012, countries may 
have had a hard time recovering since there was virtually no growth. A simple grouping from the 
2015 Proust I Index results, where countries are divided based on whether there was a recovery 
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Country 2012 2015
Austria 0.83 2.83
Belgium 1.17 1.83
Bulgaria 2.50 2.67
Croatia 6.00 8.50
Cyprus 4.50 9.67
Czech Rep. 2.83 1.83
Denmark 5.50 6.33
Estonia 3.50 4.17
Finland 2.50 5.67
France 4.17 5.83
Germany 0.00 0.00
Greece 10.33 14.67
Hungary 6.33 5.17
Ireland 8.17 6.67
Italy 7.00 10.33
Latvia 5.00 2.83
Lithuania 4.50 2.83
Luxembourg 2.50 3.33
Malta 0.83 1.33
Netherlands 4.83 7.00
Poland 2.33 2.67
Portugal 9.67 10.83
Romania 5.67 3.83
Slovakia 2.17 2.67
Slovenia 5.33 7.00
Spain 8.33 9.17
Sweden 3.50 1.67
U.K. 6.33 2.50
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Std. Dev. 2.62 3.44
Mean 4.51 5.14
Median 4.50 4.00
Max 10.33 14.67
Min 0.00 0.00
D
Figure 2.2: Proust I index using 2012 and 2015 base years. A. Proust I Indices; B. Histogram Proust I '12 
distribution; C. Histogram Proust I '15 distribution; D. Proust I Index statistics. Source: Eurostat.
from 2012’s level and total years lost (threshold at a comparatively low 3.5), would yield the 
following:
Improved: Worsened:
Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria Croatia; Cyprus; Denmark
Czech Republic; Germany; Estonia; Hungary Finland; France; Greece
Latvia; Lithuania: Luxembourg; Malta; Poland Ireland; Italy; Netherlands
Romania; Slovakia; Sweden; United Kingdom Portugal; Slovenia; Spain
However, to be more precise, a look at the individual parameters is necessary (see Figures 2.3 
and 2.4).
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Figure 2.3: Proust I Index findings in years lost for 2012 and 2015 for the Real House Cost, Financial 
Assets Held by Households and Real Wage parameters individually. Source: Eurostat.
FIN. ASSET HELD BY HH
Country/
years lost
2012 2015
Austria 0 0
Belgium 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0
Croatia 0 0
Cyprus 0 8
Czech Rep. 0 0
Denmark 0 0
Estonia 0 1
Finland 0 0
France 0 0
Germany 0 0
Greece 13 16
Hungary 0 0
Ireland 0 0
Italy 7 9
Latvia 0 0
Lithuania 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0
Malta 0 0
Netherlands 0 0
Poland 0 0
Portugal 2 0
Romania 6 0
Slovakia 0 0
Slovenia 5 0
Spain 7 0
Sweden 0 0
U.K. 0 0
REAL WAGES
Country/
years lost
2012 2015
Austria 0 0
Belgium 0 1
Bulgaria 0 0
Croatia 5 7
Cyprus 1 7
Czech Rep. 0 0
Denmark 0 0
Estonia 0 0
Finland 0 0
France 0 0
Germany 0 0
Greece 5 11
Hungary 0 0
Ireland 0 0
Italy 0 0
Latvia 0 0
Lithuania 4 0
Luxembourg 0 0
Malta 0 0
Netherlands 0 0
Poland 0 0
Portugal 4 7
Romania 0 0
Slovakia 0 0
Slovenia 0 0
Spain 0 0
Sweden 0 0
U.K. 0 0
REAL HOUSE COST
Country/
years lost
2012 2015
Austria 0 0
Belgium 0 0
Bulgaria 7 10
Croatia 8 12
Cyprus 9 12
Czech Rep. 5 8
Denmark 8 10
Estonia 7 9
Finland 2 9
France 6 9
Germany 0 0
Greece 11 17
Hungary 10 12
Ireland 14 15
Italy 8 14
Latvia 8 10
Lithuania 8 10
Luxembourg 0 0
Malta 5 8
Netherlands 12 15
Poland 8 9
Portugal 17 20
Romania 10 14
Slovakia 6 9
Slovenia 6 10
Spain 9 14
Sweden 0 0
U.K. 8 7
CBA
2.4.1  Real House Cost
For every E.U. country, the time series (see Appendix, Tables A through F) for the real value of 
the house rises into the 2000’s peaking around 2007-2008, after which they entered into the 
economic crisis. Recovery ranges from two years (Sweden, Germany and Bulgaria) to 
nonexistent (Greece, Italy and the Netherlands). Table A in Figure 2.3 presents their years lost 
for this parameter both in 2012 and in 2015, and performance is classified in Figure 2.5. Just 
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HH EXPENDITURE
Country/
years lost
2012 2015
Austria 0 0
Belgium 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0
Croatia 5 8
Cyprus 0 6
Czech Rep. 1 3
Denmark 0 0
Estonia 0 0
Finland 1 0
France 0 0
Germany 0 0
Greece 7 11
Hungary 5 8
Ireland 7 7
Italy 1 4
Latvia 5 0
Lithuania 5 0
Luxembourg 0 0
Malta 0 0
Netherlands 4 0
Poland 0 0
Portugal 5 5
Romania 5 0
Slovakia 0 0
Slovenia 1 6
Spain 5 8
Sweden 0 0
U.K. 7 0
UNEMPLOYMENT
Country/
years lost
2012 2015
Austria 5 10
Belgium 5 10
Bulgaria 8 6
Croatia 11 14
Cyprus 7 10
Czech Rep. 6 0
Denmark 18 19
Estonia 8 7
Finland 6 15
France 13 18
Germany 0 0
Greece 13 16
Hungary 16 11
Ireland 18 18
Italy 13 17
Latvia 11 7
Lithuania 10 7
Luxembourg 8 11
Malta 0 0
Netherlands 7 19
Poland 6 7
Portugal 27 30
Romania 6 9
Slovakia 7 7
Slovenia 14 17
Spain 18 21
Sweden 14 10
U.K. 16 8
REAL GDP
Country/
years lost
2012 2015
Austria 0 7
Belgium 2 0
Bulgaria 0 0
Croatia 7 10
Cyprus 10 15
Czech Rep. 5 0
Denmark 7 9
Estonia 6 8
Finland 6 10
France 6 8
Germany 0 0
Greece 13 17
Hungary 7 0
Ireland 10 0
Italy 13 18
Latvia 6 0
Lithuania 0 0
Luxembourg 7 9
Malta 0 0
Netherlands 6 8
Poland 0 0
Portugal 13 13
Romania 7 0
Slovakia 0 0
Slovenia 6 9
Spain 11 12
Sweden 7 0
U.K. 7 0
D E F
Figure 2.4: Proust I Index findings in years lost for 2012 and 2015 for the Household Expenditure, 
Unemployment Rate and Real GDP parameters individually. Source: Eurostat. 
about every country, except for Luxembourg, 
Sweden, Austria, Belgium and Germany, have 
lost progress. For 2015, the value of the 
average E.U. homeowner’s dwelling was that of 
9.6 years ago, with fifteen out of twenty-eight 
losing even more than that. In particular, 
Greece, Ireland, Netherlands and Romania lost 
over fifteen years. Rather shockingly, Finnish 
homeowners went from having lost no progress 
in 2012 to facing house values of 2006 three 
years later. A closer look at the time series 
shows that their values had been decreasing 
steadily since 2010— not a good sign. Aside 
from those that lost no years, only eight 
countries had overcome their 2012 value, half 
of which remained below 2010’s level. 
Southern countries are the ones most hurt by it, 
although significant losses are present in the 
East as well. Croatia, Italy, Slovenia and to a 
lesser extent Cyprus were at the E.U.’s average 
in 2012 but found themselves well below in 2015. Portugal was especially hurt: its 2015 value 
was completely unprecedented in its entire series, which from 1995 onwards hovered over 100, 
well above the E.U.’s average. After 2010, it fell significantly, yet in 2015 slightly improved from 
its 2012 level. Nevertheless, these countries’ house prices fell strikingly compared to the rest of 
the E.U. 
Furthermore, the rate of homeownership measured in the previously mentioned house cost ECB 
study  shows that the countries with decreases in housing value are also some of the countries 72
with the highest rate of homeownership. This is the case with Spain (83% of households own a 
house), Slovenia (82%), Cyprus (77%), Portugal (71%), Italy (69%) and Finland (68%). These 
are also some of the countries whose household wealth is determined the most by the value of 
the house: Spain (53%), Slovenia (68%), Italy (61%), and Finland (61%), the average of the 
eurozone being 51%. Only Cyprus and Portugal had a somewhat lower percentage, at 30% an 
44%, respectively. This parameter suggests that, ceteris paribus, homeowners spread across 
the whole E.U.’s wealth suffered a significant blow.
The classification of the countries into groups by performance, taking into consideration years 
lost, position relative to the E.U. average and percentage change over 2012-2015, yielded the 
results shown above.
As one can see, an almost equal number of countries performed well (twelve) as those who 
didn’t (eleven), with only five countries borderline. A clear split is evident.
 (Mathä, Thomas; Porpiglia, Alessandro; Ziegelmeyer, Michael 2014)72
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IMPROVED BORDERLINE WORSENED
Belgium Poland Greece
Germany Romania Spain
Luxembourg Bulgaria Croa>a
Austria Hungary Italy
Sweden Slovakia Cyprus
Czech Rep. Netherlands
Denmark Ireland
Estonia France
Latvia Portugal
Lithuania Slovenia
Malta Finland
U.K.
Figure 2.5: Real house cost performance ranking.
2.4.2  Total Financial Assets Held by Households
For this parameter, the findings were much less negative (Figure 2.6). A similar dip occurred in 
2007-2008, but in this case most E.U. countries recovered. Cyprus was the only country in 
which households in 2015 held less financial assets than in 2012, although Italy and Greece’s 
recovery past their 2012 value is moderate because of the value being the same as a decade 
before. Otherwise, every other country’s values increased. This is most likely due to the fact that 
these particular data are in nominal terms: growth rates from 2012-2015 become especially 
useful in capturing countries’ divergences rather than years lost. These show that Baltic 
households experienced a tremendous increase in financial asset wealth of around 25%, along 
with several Eastern countries. In the West, France, Ireland, Spain and Germany’s rates were 
still very strong (around 15%), yet lower than in the East. The Southern area continues to suffer 
as Croatia, Portugal and Slovenia experienced a slowdown in growth — the average of the 
three being around 8%. While still good, relatively they are lagging. 
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IMPROVED BORDERLINE WORSENED
Belgium Croa>a Cyprus
Bulgaria Portugal Greece
Denmark Slovenia Italy
Germany Estonia
Luxembourg Romania
Finland Malta
Sweden
Czech Rep.
Ireland
Spain
France
Latvia
Lithuania
Hungary
Austria
Poland
Slovakia
U.K.
Netherlands
Country ’12-’15 
growth
EU28 17.02%
€-zone 13.06%
Belgium 15.36%
Bulgaria 37.43%
Czech Rep. 10.13%
Denmark 19.42%
Germany 14.23%
Estonia 24.84%
Ireland 14.46%
Greece 10.63%
Spain 16.37%
France 12.43%
Croatia 14.12%
Italy 9.10%
Cyprus -9.39%
Country ’12-’15 
growth
Latvia 33.14%
Lithuania 21.98%
Luxembourg 28.86%
Hungary 17.11%
Malta 27.87%
Netherlands 15.42%
Austria 11.11%
Poland 17.18%
Portugal 5.31%
Romania 36.35%
Slovenia 8.01%
Slovakia 24.74%
Finland 20.13%
Sweden 26.65%
U.K. 27.06%
A B
Figure 2.6: A. Performance ranking for the ‘Total financial assets held by households’ 
parameter, and B. Table of the rate of growth from 2012-2015 for all E.U. countries 
individually, along with the E.U. and eurozone aggregates for comparison.
The three countries performing poorly in this parameter, along with the three borderline 
countries Croatia, Portugal and Slovenia, also appear in the ‘worsened’ group of house value. 
This would suggest that their household wealth has decreased, both in national terms and 
relative to other E.U. countries. Similarly, the remaining countries that saw a decrease in house 
cost and an increase in financial assets see a greater portion of their households’ wealth tied to 
a more volatile sector. These are Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain, Croatia and the Netherlands 
mainly. The problems associated with these two dynamics, namely a decrease in consumption 
due to lower disposable income and a higher risk of losing more wealth in case of an economic 
downturn, are not uniform across the E.U. and thus opposite strategies are required.
2.4.3  Real Wages
In terms of real wages, performance is much less uniform. As of 2015, the E.U. as a whole has 
seen an increase in wages by seven percent since 2012. Comparing to this average, three 
blocs appear (Figure 2.7). The worst, again dominated by Southern European countries and 
Ireland, is largely characterized by a loss in wage progress. Greece heads this list with eleven 
years lost in 2015, followed by Cyprus and Portugal (both at seven). While the remaining 
countries – Ireland, Italy, Spain and Slovenia – experienced an improvement in wages both in 
2012 and in 2015, they are well below the E.U.’s average and the trends do not suggest that 
they are gaining back ground compared to their partners. The ‘improved’ group sees twelve 
countries at or above the E.U.’s average increase, with Eastern countries in particular seeing a 
significant increase in real wages of on average 
20% since 2012. Finally, eight countries are 
borderline. They do not have any years lost yet 
their 2015 value hovers around the E.U. average.
Recalling the aforementioned discussion on 
internal devaluation, and that wages are the 
largest component of a firm’s production costs, it 
would seem that wages decreased only in 
Greece, Cyprus and to a minimal extent 
Portugal. Of the countries where wages 
increased slightly above the E.U.’s average, 
some surprises emerge: Belgium, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and most notably Germany. While 
not directly implying causation, this finding 
certainly casts doubts about the cooperation 
between these countries in terms of internal 
devaluation and allowing member-states to 
recover competitiveness and thus giving up 
export market shares. Certainly there are political 
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IMPROVED BORDERLINE WORSENED
Bulgaria Belgium Greece
Estonia Denmark Cyprus
Latvia Germany Portugal
Lithuania Netherlands Ireland
Romania Finland Spain
Czech Rep. France Croa>a
Luxembourg Sweden Italy
Hungary U.K. Slovenia
Malta
Austria
Poland
Slovakia
Figure 2.7: Real Wage performance ranking.
and practical domestic obstacles as labor markets are not nearly as flexible as the neoliberal 
theory would require. Nevertheless, studies find that the rigidity is singularly strong when it 
comes to decreasing wages  (known as Downward Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity, as could 73
be the case for Italy, Portugal, Spain and other low-performing countries that have not 
decreased their real wages ) and not for increasing them. Ultimately however, more research is 74
required to answer this question.
2.4.4  Household Expenditure
The final parameter, household consumption 
expenditure, sees another significant division in 
performance (Figure 2.8). Ten countries lost 
years, seven of which worsened their situation. 
In particular, Greece’s households consumed on 
the level of 2004, a 26% reduction from their 
peak in 2008. To a lesser extent the same can 
be said of Croatia (8% reduction) and Hungary 
(7% reduction). Of the remaining three, two 
(Portugal and Finland) improved slightly, but 
their growth rate was lower than the E.U. 
average. As in the total financial assets 
parameter, Eastern countries Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania Romania experienced huge increases 
of 15% on average. The largest increase 
however came from the United Kingdom, which 
saw a 2012-2015 increase of almost 24%. Given 
household expenditure’s significance in 
domestic demand, over one third of E.U. 
countries’ contribution to it decreased. This 
lessens businesses’ revenue, which in turn 
lowers the amount they can spend on 
production and in turn leads to worker count 
being reduced. The values could be understated 
because of their being in normal terms.
Six out of the eight countries that had decreases in house cost, financial assets and real wages 
also worsened in terms of household expenditure. While calculating the magnitude of how much 
 (Babecký, Jan; Du Caju, Philip; Kosma, Theodora; Lawless, Martina; Messina, Julián; Rõõm, Tairi 2010, Messina, 73
Julián; Duarte, Cláudia Filipa; Izquierdo, Mario; Du Caju, Philip; Hansen, Niels Lynggård 2010, Stuchlik, A. 2015)
 (Babecký, Jan; Du Caju, Philip; Kosma, Theodora; Lawless, Martina; Messina, Julián; Rõõm, Tairi 2010)74
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IMPROVED BORDERLINE WORSENED
Belgium Portugal Greece
Bulgaria Finland Cyprus
Denmark Ireland Croa>a
Germany Spain
Estonia Italy
Latvia Hungary
Lithuania Slovenia
Malta Czech	Rep.
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Slovakia
Sweden Figure 2.8: Household expenditure performance ranking.
the decrease in household wealth and wages affects household expenditure requires more 
research (forming a more accurate causation), and consequently on domestic demand, it is 
nevertheless clear that many of the same countries appear consistently worsening in similar 
problems in the same sectors. This is important in a discussion on the role the Proust I Index 
can play in the aggregation of groups based on performance.
2.4.5  Unemployment Rate
The divergences within the E.U. for this parameter 
are quite pronounced (Figure 2.9). In the year of 
the original Proust Index, the unemployment rate 
ranged from a minimum of 4.9% in Austria to a 
maximum of 24.5% in Greece. In 2015, this gap 
does not diminish, increasing slightly from 24.9% 
in Greece to 4.6% in Germany. The average, 
9.4%, is very high and denotes the already well-
known employment problem on the European 
continent. At the same time this is an improvement 
from 2012’s E.U. average which was 10.5%. This 
would suggest that unemployment has improved 
for several member-states, but given that the 
range increases, for some it has worsened. For the 
sake of comparison, if 2015’s average were 
slightly lowered to 9%, which is still worryingly high, fourteen countries are higher, or half the 
E.U. About one third of its member-states saw an improvement from 2012, while another third 
worsened. In 2015, the average unemployment rate for the countries in the ‘worsened’ category 
was 13.6%, while for the ‘improved’ it was less than half, at 6.67%. The difference is quite 
staggering.
2.4.6  Real GDP
In this parameter, thirteen countries were below the E.U. average growth rate from 2012-2015 
(indexed for comparability, see Appendix Table F). Of these, fourteen lost years (Figure 2.10). 
While most improved in 2015, Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Finland in particular worsened from 
2012. Austria also lost an important seven years, however its data is very tight and so a small 
change overestimates the negative consequences. To properly analyze the divergences, a 
specific focus on growth rates was needed. In fact, Austria’s growth rate from 2012 is slightly 
under zero, which is genuinely worrying. France similarly largely stagnated from 2012 with its 
years lost overestimating its negative performance. Nevertheless, in comparison to the E.U.’s 
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IMPROVED BORDERLINE WORSENED
Czech Rep. Lithuania Greece
Germany Romania Spain
Estonia Sweden Cyprus
Malta Latvia Croa>a
Bulgaria Luxembourg Italy
Denmark Hungary Portugal
Austria Netherlands Ireland
Poland Lithuania France
Slovakia Slovenia
U.K. Finland
Belgium
Figure 2.9: Unemployment performance ranking.
average growth rate it is much lower. On the 
other hand, several countries experienced 
massive growth in real GDP from 2012-2015. 
Ireland grew by 37%, but also Malta (18%), 
Lithuania (12%) and Romania (12%) performed 
exceptionally well. Other countries like Germany 
and Belgium had lower growth rates than the E.U. 
average, however their real GDP measure 
experienced virtually no setbacks (the latter lost 
two years in 2012 but had already recovered into 
2014, and the former grew steadily) through the 
crisis, signifying that their production weathered 
the downturn almost entirely. Along broad lines, 
Eastern countries in general increased their 
annual output greatly, while Southern Europe and 
Finland again are left behind. 
2.4.7  Robustness for Methodology
In order to further strengthen the above findings, 
a type of robustness test for the Proust I Index’s 
methodology was devised. Its purpose was to see if a purely mechanical approach could 
reproduce its findings. To do so, the equation tracks how many years separate the ‘year zero’ 
from the first local maximum. If the value was lower than this peak, than a one for that year was 
added. At the end, the total amount of years in which a one shows up is the calculation of years 
lost and subsequent grouping, in a purely quantitative way so as to see just how strong my 
methodology is. This methodology works well for three types of trends: when a parameter that 
increases steadily reaches a peak, decreases for a little but then recovers past their peak; when 
a parameter continues to increase; and when there is no recovery following the peak. However, 
this test encounters problems in situations of two local maximums close to each other. More 
specifically, consider a country that peaks before the crisis, dips for two years, recovers again 
and then dips again into 2015— the test would calculate years lost from the nearest peak to 
‘year zero’. In this case, it would occur during the crisis and not the peak before, thus skipping 
the years lost following the first peak (due to the crisis) and underestimating the number of 
years lost. This goes to show that a qualitative element, which may elect to skip the nearest 
local maximum in such a case, is indeed crucial for getting an accurate measure. Since this 
double-dip dynamic is common in the datasets used, the qualitative element was incorporated 
into the Proust I Index, so the robustness test confirms the methodology employed (see 
appendix for robustness test findings).
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IMPROVED BORDERLINE WORSENED
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Figure 2.10: Real GDP 
performance ranking.
2.4.8  Concluding Remarks
By isolating the individual parameters, the divergences within the E.U. are obviously more 
marked and specific. Over all six parameters, an average of almost 30% of countries performed 
significantly worse than their fellow member-states in years lost, in comparison to the E.U.’s 
average and in terms of growth rates from 2012 to 2015. This equates to a bit more than eight 
countries. If the borderline countries tending on bad performance are extended to the 
proportion, the average rises to 40% of E.U. countries— about eleven out of the twenty-eight. 
The divergent performance is most clearly balanced in two parameters, unemployment and 
house cost, and least captured in the two nominal variables, household expenditure and total 
financial assets held by households. Most countries’ categorizations are consistent across all 
the parameters. These include Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the Baltic states doing well, and 
the PIIGS countries, Croatia and Cyprus, and to a lesser extent Finland and Slovenia doing 
poorly. The basis for two sizable groups thus emerges.
2.5  GROUPS BASED ON INDIVIDUAL PARAMETERS
Given the evident divergences found above and a strong proportion on both sides, the idea of 
two distinct groups emerges. However in addition to the first grouping above based on the 
overall Proust I Index measure (page 22), at least two other groupings can be derived from each 
individual parameter’s classifications. The second grouping involves aggregating the countries’ 
ranking in each parameter. Countries with a higher percentage of ‘red’ classifications go into one 
group, while those with more ‘green’ classifications go into the other. ‘Borderline’ parameters are 
assigned to ‘green’ if they are ‘light blue’, else to ‘red’ if they are ‘dark blue’. Ultimately, this 
definition lumps together countries that have on average more lost years than others, negative 
trends and/or levels below the E.U.’s average across all six parameters of the economy. It is the 
full extension of what the Proust I Index can offer in this regard.
The third grouping is much narrower, focusing on a sector rather than the overall economy. The 
reasoning for doing this is to see whether forming a group to target a specific sector or policy 
area would yield consistent results across other economic variables, or if this would instead 
generate inefficient results outside of its scope. For example, consider a two-speed Europe set-
up that allows one group to target the household wealth sector with the goal to stimulate 
consumption and raise living standards through it. Groups would be determined based on 
performance in the two main areas of household wealth in the index: house cost and total 
financial assets held by households. The same methodology would apply for extrapolating 
countries’ performance, so essentially this is a localized version of the second grouping above. 
However, instead of seeing how divergent countries are over the entire range of the parameters, 
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the hypothesis now becomes: does this objective yield efficient allocations in other sectors (i.e., 
divergent trends still show up in the other parameters for the same groups)? If so, then one can 
conclude that such an allotment focused primarily on resolving issues in a particular sector still 
allow different policies to be effective in other areas. A political element could be introduced for 
member-states to decide on areas to target and form groups consequentially. This could be an 
especially persuasive route for implementing a two-speed Europe for economic recovery. If 
certain sectors like unemployment were decided politically to be the initial focus, the group 
would remain relevant for further actions. However, were the divergence to exist only in the 
specific area, then this definition would not lead to an efficient grouping for the long term, and 
would be obsolete once those parameters improved. For this thesis, a grouping on household 
wealth was used.
We now have three groups: the Overall Proust I grouping, the Individual Parameter grouping, 
and the Household Wealth grouping. To ascertain which of these is most indicative of the 
divergent economic trends, and thus provides groups where tailored policy could have the most 
effect, the time series performance of each group was averaged in all parameters. Data were 
indexed to 2010 to capture the trends and eliminate the weights of big countries. For example, if 
real GDP were measured simply in euro, comparatively small countries like Latvia or Romania 
would not affect the graphs, only Germany, France, the United Kingdom or Italy would. Instead I 
am measuring solely trends. The gap is then contrasted between the three groupings. The 
greater the gap, the more different the two groups are within the same grouping and thus the 
more similar the performance inside a group is.
Figure 2.11 summarizes the three groupings, Overall Proust I Grouping, Individual Parameter 
Grouping, and Household Wealth Grouping, and the graphs in Figure 2.12 depict each group’s 
trends across all parameters. The three different two-speed Europe definitions yield similar, yet 
distinct enough results to allow for a singular definition to be gauged as most effective. In all of 
the graphs above, the red and green lines diverge more than they ever have following 2007-08. 
In most cases, the divergence is getting larger into 2016. The time series data that were 
averaged were indexed to 2010 so as to eliminate the distortion from big countries. This is 
because if the values were kept in quantities (such as millions of euro), most of the E.U. 
countries’s data would be dwarfed by that of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
Instead, by indexing them the focus becomes on the trends of these countries, which is what 
countries are divided by in the first place. By eye, greater divergences can be discerned in 
certain parameters. This is particularly the case for unemployment, where the Individual 
Parameter grouping averages’ divergence starts sooner, and the gap is greater, than the other 
groupings. In a similar fashion, the Overall Proust I Index grouping averages for household 
expenditure are rather close after 2010, while the other two groupings’ diverge at similar times. 
The Individual Parameter grouping exhibits less divergence in the house cost averages 
compared to the other two groupings. A more mathematically precise way to discern the 
grouping with the most defined divergences was devised.
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The gap between two groups of the same grouping can be measured on a yearly basis. If each 
parameter’s annual gaps are summed (in absolute value terms), then the groupings’ own total 
divergence can be compared this way. A further step involves dividing each grouping’s gap by 
that year’s total group value. This normalizes the gap so as to show it as a proportion of the 
magnitude of the values compared. For example, a gap between 100 and 105 is proportionally 
much less than a gap between say five and ten. The division by the total encompasses this 
weight. In order to capture only the effect of the crisis, the analysis of the divergence will begin 
starting at the year 2000 as any divergence prior will have other determinants.
Figure 2.13 reveals the gap between each group’s average in each parameter and for every 
year, has rather significant findings. Up to 2010, the divergence between the gaps decreases. 
This means that the groups’ performances within all groupings were slowly converging. 
However, since then the divergence has been growing, with the Individual Parameter grouping’s 
gap remarkably greater than those of the other two, which are almost identical. It is important to 
note that since the gap compares averaged indexes, it is normal that the 2010 value will be 
almost the same for all as it was the base year for four out of the six parameters. Nevertheless, 
the Individual Parameter grouping exhibits significantly more of a differentiation between its 
groups following 2010. Interestingly, this was not the case prior to 2010, when it was the Overall 
Proust I grouping that exhibited the most difference. But, for a two-speed framework following 
the wake of the 2007-2008 economic crisis, the Individual Parameter grouping offers the best 
distinction of countries going forward. It would thus be better for advising a two-speed 
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INDIVIDUAL PARMETER
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HOUSEHOLD WEALTH
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Figure 2.11: Country groups within each diﬀerent grouping: the Overall Proust I Grouping is in grey, 
Individual Parameter Grouping is in blue and Household Wealth Grouping is in orange.
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Figure 2.12: Average of countries in specific group’s time series (indexed), per grouping. Source: Eurostat. 
demarcation within the E.U. compared to the other groupings. The Individual Parameter 
grouping provides the best demarcation across all parameters, providing opportunities in each 
of them for specific policies to have a strong effect without having to change its composition.
In this case, the specific sector grouping through Household Wealth targeting does not perform 
well compared to the other groupings, neither in gap trend between its two groups nor in the 
total amount of this gap (the summation of every year’s normalized gap starting in 2000 is 4.1 
which is much less than the over 5.75 for both other groupings). This would suggest that its 
groups are more heterogeneous in other parameters and thus any policy in different sectors 
would be less efficient.
2.5.1  Concluding Remarks
All in all, the new Proust I Index that I developed showcases significant divergent 
macroeconomic trends within the E.U. and allows groupings to be determined based upon these 
trends. Ultimately, one particular grouping is chosen above the others which exhibits the most 
defined divergence between its two groups, meaning that the countries within each are most 
related in terms of trends. In the context of a potential two-speed Europe, the Proust I Index’s 
methodology provides a strong, concrete way of divvying up the two groups that is rooted in 
objective analysis of data, something which is currently missing both in the apposite literature 
and in any publicly available research. The findings go against the current political rhetoric that it 
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Figure 2.13: Comparison of gap between groupings’ groups. Source: Eurostat. 
is solely the PIIGS and Mediterranean countries that are lagging behind the rest of the E.U.: 
Finland, Slovenia and France surprise in this regard for being in the same group, both in how 
their neighboring countries are performing (Slovakia and Sweden doing very well) and for being 
always considered a strong country (France). This opens new and interesting scenarios for 
economic and political discussions on the E.U. and its future. 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3.0  CONCLUSIONS
3.1  FURTHER DISCUSSION
3.1.1  Flaws
The Proust Index along with its updated and slightly altered version, the Proust I Index, present 
a few flaws. One of the most obvious criticisms that can be made towards using its years-
backward approach starting from a base year is how much changing the base year could affect 
the years lost calculation. This is particularly the case for volatile datasets that exhibit jumps 
from one year to the next. In such a case, years lost may underestimate or overestimate the 
actual trends. An example of this is the household expenditure variable used in the Proust I 
Index. Measured in nominal terms, the UK it exhibits the strongest growth of the whole E.U. 
However, its 2016 value (not included in the index but available from Eurostat) jumps down 
significantly. Were the test done for 2016, the number of years lost for the UK would be greater 
and, while this would not change the UK’s classification in either group, the year for which the 
calculation is computed nonetheless presents a problem of continuity. For this parameter, the 
same dip does not occur for other countries that continue their trends into 2016, but this issue 
remains a potential weakness. Part of this issue lies in the difficulty of selecting of an 
appropriate deflator to remove the impact of price changes from the parameters. As mentioned 
in Chapter Two, no deflators were used for the household expenditure or total household 
financial assets parameters in this analysis because none were found. Nonetheless, the choice 
of deflator may be considered a potential flaw for any out-sized affect it has on the outcomes.
However, two aspects were consequentially incorporated in my version of the Proust I Index to 
help mitigate these issues. The first is to treat as much of the data in the Proust Index (which 
had apposite deflators) as possible in real terms, and to compensate for calendar and seasonal 
effects. This reduces any volatility caused by prices or by behavior in different times of the year. 
Real values over time usually crawl rather than jump, meaning that the possible variation from 
one year to the next is small compared to nominal values that can spike or decrease due to 
price changes as well as to goods and services changes. While not completely eliminating the 
risk that the conjuncture may change the Proust I Index’s values on a yearly basis, my approach 
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aims to minimize it. Rolling averages over three-year or five-year spans may be worth exploring 
to further help smoothen volatility. However, if volatility is intrinsic to the variable, excessive 
effort at flattening it may prove misleading. Because the majority of variables are in real terms 
that are seasonally and calendar adjusted, the impact of a nominal variable’s potential spikes on 
the total are reduced. Secondly, regarding the application of the Proust I Index in selecting 
groups, the procedure by which countries are divided includes two tests (E.U. average 
comparison and 2012-2015 growth trends) that are external to the Index’s ‘years lost’ calculation 
and set entirely in the time series. As such, the bias that a misreading of years lost could have 
on groupings is effectively annulled.
Another potential flaw comes in the handling of the household wealth variable. If this variable’s 
aggregates used in the original Proust Index really make up a significant majority, then its usage 
would prove redundant and muddy the results. On the other hand, if the supplementary 
components of household wealth do indeed weigh more than is assumed in this thesis, thus 
making the aggregate an important variable, then their omission would also affect the accuracy 
of the results. At this point, perhaps the aggregates ought to be eliminated.The original Proust 
Index article lacks clarity in this regard, and the question of whether to incorporate a household 
wealth variable or not is unresolved. 
Thirdly, the practical flaws associated with a two-speed Europe briefly mentioned above, 
particularly if the groupings separate eurozone countries, may prove unsurmountable and block 
the project from taking off. Policies in one group, which may be inflationary, could go against 
policies to contain inflation in the other group. Asymmetric shocks, as occurs today, would 
similarly affect the balance of the common currency. Maintaining the euro as is through these 
scenarios, while also trying to follow two different strategies, would simply be impossible. A 
theoretical solution to this problem would be the introduction of two currencies, one per bloc. 
While Joseph Stiglitz would applaud this idea, it opens a whole new discussion that would form 
the scope of a separate thesis.  These complications may very well be why Jean-Claude 75
Juncker did not include economic two-speed in his White Paper. On a more general level, the 
existence of Fitoussi and Saraceno’s social pressure may inhibit countries from wanting to join a 
particular group, thus making them unwilling to go forward with a multi-speed framework. 
Ultimately, the bureaucratic, political and social problems would only foment uncertainty. 
Perhaps the institutional changes needed to create the preconditions for such a two-speed 
system to be implemented, such as allowing ECB to back domestic debt or introducing a form of 
governance in the eurozone, would resolve the economic woes on their own without the need 
for actually implementing the multi-speed solution. Several research in this regard already 
exists.76
 (Stiglitz, Joseph 2016, Stiglitz, Joseph 2016)75
 (Hennette, Stéphanie; Piketty, Thomas; Sacriste, Guillaume; Vauchez, Antoine 2017)76
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3.1.2  Future Directions
The relative inadequacy of the Household Wealth grouping in showcasing definite groups in the 
rest of the variables raises questions on the effectiveness of the Individual Parameter grouping 
in other, new sectors. As such, two immediate possible future scenarios arise for the Proust I 
Index and its groupings. The first is to apply the Individual Parameter grouping in new areas 
with different variables and see how its two groups perform. If the current demarcation is still the 
most defined, then this further strengthens the selection of countries for each group. On the 
other hand, if the groups are less obvious, maybe the Proust I Index would need to be 
expanded to include more variables. For example, the activity rate which captures the amount of 
people leaving the labor force, or the poverty rate (as observed in several interesting tranches 
like the in-work poverty rate or the material depravation rate), may provide new ways of 
differentiating countries and further break down the unemployment parameter. This more in-
depth view could reappraise the groups if, for example, a country with a low unemployment rate 
is also characterized by a rising number of people leaving the labor force. Such a scenario 
would indicate serious employment problems since people are increasingly discouraged from 
even look for a job. A further breakdown of the unemployment rate by age groups could point 
out new ares of divergence that, particularly in the future, could become problematic. Together, 
these may imply that some countries doing well according to the Proust I Index do indeed have 
employment problems that are not captured by the unemployment variable alone, and whom 
may benefit from being in a different group.
Similarly, another variable that can help delve deeper into the similarities between countries is 
the Gini Index which measures the distribution of income in a nation and its effect on output. A 
recent study by the chief economist of the Dutch bank ING, Mark Cliffe, shows that income 
inequality increases during times of crisis but, more importantly, doesn’t always decrease during 
times of economic growth.  Furthermore, within advanced economies, the OECD finds that 77
income inequality’s rise between 1990 to 2010 has knocked 4.7 percentage points off of 
cumulative growth.  This occurs through missed investment in human capital, as those in low 78
socio-economic conditions have serious difficulty accessing high-quality education.  Social 79
mobility consequentially is decreased and talent goes untapped. More specifically, the study 
finds that a 1-point decrease in the Gini coefficient would result in a 0.8 percentage points rise 
of cumulative growth in the short term (a five year period), equating to a 0.15 percentage point 
increase each year.  In the long term, such as a twenty-five year period, the same 1-point Gini 80
coefficient decrease would increase average cumulative growth by over 0.1 percentage points 
annually.  Like in the case of the activity rate, this new parameter ties in well with the current 81
 (Cliﬀe, Mark; Manceaux, Julien 2016)77
 (OECD 2015)78
 (OECD 2015)79
 (OECD 2015)80
 (OECD 2015)81
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real wage and annual output parameters of the Proust I Index and can highlight new groups 
where problems exist in the E.U. 
Other variables also come to mind, such as export shares, productivity and even debt 
sustainability. If aggregated, such an index could be called the Zweig Index after Austrian author 
Stefan Zweig, a contemporary of Proust’s who, discouraged by the fate of Europe during 1941 
and by his treatment as a Jew, wrote a book entitled The World of Yesterday which fittingly 
(albeit fortuitously) matches the theme of ‘lost time’. Furthermore, the fusion of the Zweig Index 
and the Proust I Index would begin to resemble the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure that 
the E.U. Commission uses to examine member-states’ macroeconomic performance, albeit the 
methodology of years lost, comparison to the E.U. average and growth rates make it distinct.
3.2  CONCLUSION
The current political, economic and social situation may be leading towards dissolution of the 
E.U. At the very least, the prolonged economic stagnation and downturn for some countries, but 
not others, in addition to the increasing impact of the migration crisis, are putting into serious 
question the stability of European integration and the respective member-states’ commitment to 
it. This situation has prompted E.U. leaders, most notably Jean Claude Juncker, to open up a 
discussion about a future path for the E.U. The most favored option today is that of a ‘two-
speed’ Europe whereby countries that want to integrate more in certain areas (particularly 
defense and foreign policy) do so voluntarily, and those that do not are free to refuse. Brief 
research into the current E.U. institutional framework shows that this is already legally possible 
but that several forces (specifically Fitoussi and Saraceno’s social norm pressure and national 
interests) impede a proper commitment to them. In the area of economic recovery for those 
countries that consistently continue to be in trouble, and for those that are beginning to be in 
trouble, a potential two-speed solution would require an objective definition to divide up the 
countries.
An update and adaptation of the Proust Index, an index devised by The Economist that  
quantifies the impact of the 2007-2008 crisis in terms of lost economic time, provides answers to 
the two broad questions that the current E.U. scenario poses on the future of Europe: 
macroeconomic trends do suggest that divergences within the E.U. clearly exist and are 
increasing; and an objective definition based on a quantitative analysis of macroeconomic 
trends does show the existence of two groups of countries within the E.U. that have similar 
macroeconomic performance. Most importantly, the groups’ trends are consistent across the six 
parameters that span the range of the economy included in this Index, asserting the grouping’s 
theoretical functionality and effectiveness. Despite some flaws, the overall simplicity leading to a 
seemingly rational multi-speed division of E.U. countries suggests that this work could form a 
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sound a basis for any methodology that would be required to implement an actual two-speed 
Europe based on economic performance. While such changes may face insurmountable 
obstacles in the form of bureaucracy, weak political will and the effects of social norms and 
national interests, at the very least this research outlines clear areas of divergence that 
unquestionably exist. Furthermore, since the findings indicate that the gap between the groups 
continues to widen, this research underlines the urgency for a solution to be found even by 
retaining the current single-tier framework. Such a situation would necessitate a change in the 
E.U. framework to allow policies that are more tailored to member-states needs.
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Appendix
The tables below represent the time series data used to compile the Proust I Index and the 
subsequent groupings. Descriptions of the data are written in red and highlighted in yellow 
above each table. Baseline years are highlighted in orange, and the 2008 downturn is in grey. 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